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Introduction
At the moment, there are two instruments at the European level that protect fundamental rights: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). According to Article 52(3) CFR, the meaning and scope of the rights provided by the CFR must be at least the same as the meaning and scope of corresponding rights provided by the ECHR. Several provisions are only applicable in case of a 'criminal charge', such as the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR), the legality principle (Article 7 ECHR), the presumption of innocence and the right of defence (Article 48 CFR), the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49 CFR) and the ne bis in idem principle (Article 50 CFR). It is important that both Courts -i.e. the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) -qualify the same sanctions as criminal in nature 1 ; otherwise the CJEU might not offer at least the same level of protection as the ECtHR as required by Article 52(3) CFR.
This article focuses on so-called targeted financial sanctions (see section II). It analyses whether these sanctions are qualified as criminal in nature by the ECtHR and the CJEU, respectively. Furthermore, it discusses whether the two Courts differ on the qualification of targeted financial sanctions as criminal in nature and how possible differences should be evaluated from the viewpoint of Article 52(3) CFR. 2 One of these targeted financial sanctions -the payment of an administrative fine (Article 5 sub a of Regulation 2988/95 on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests) -has been one of the most popular targeted financial sanctions since the 1980s, at least in the Netherlands. 3 Imagine that you have committed a traffic offence and that you have received an administrative fine (as was the case in Öztürk v. Germany; see section III.2). Can you invoke the right to a fair trial? And does the presumption of innocence apply? The answer to these questions depends on the question as to whether the fine is criminal in nature. It would be problematic if the ECtHR answered in the affirmative (which it does; see section III.2) and the CJEU did not, since this will result in a violation of Article 52(3) CFR. Taking into account that this sanction is imposed frequently, this example shows that the issue is highly relevant.
This article is structured as follows; The first section describes the relation between the ECtHR and the CJEU and discusses the meaning and purpose of Article 52(3) CFR. The second section succinctly elucidates the term 'targeted financial sanctions'. After that, the qualification of targeted financial sanctions in the case law of the ECtHR respectively the CJEU is discussed (section III and IV). These parts thus provide an overview of both Courts' general doctrine and the reasoning applied in specific cases in which the Courts considered whether a certain sanction is criminal in nature, and the resulting decisions as to the qualification of these sanctions. The fifth section examines the similarities and the differences between the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU and evaluates possible differences in the light of Article 52(3) CFR. The conclusion provides an answer to the research question and speculates upon future developments.
The Relation between the ECtHR and the CJEU
Quinn describes the relation between the ECtHR and CJEU beautifully by stating that the EU and the Council of Europe were like twins separated at birth, but growing increasingly close nowadays. 4 The main goal of both Courts was to realise European integration, but the path chosen towards this integration was different. The Council of Europe has chosen the path of common European standards of human rights, whereas the EU has chosen the economic path by focusing on establishing a common market. 5 However, in response to some landmark cases in which the importance of the protection of human rights was established explicitly, the economically oriented CJEU also recognised the importance of protecting these rights. 6 Nevertheless, there are still certain limits to the protection of human rights by the CJEU; see section V.2.c.
Nowadays, the protection of fundamental human rights is codified in several treaties, such as the CFR, of which Article 52(3) is of utmost value as to the relation between the ECtHR and the CJEU. This provision determines that
"in so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights as guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection".
As such, the CFR should provide at least the same protection as the ECHR. The meaning of Article 52(3) CFR has been clarified in the DEB case 7 , as the CJEU stated that not only the text of the ECHR is a determinant of the meaning and scope of the guaranteed fundamental rights, but also the case law of the ECtHR. Therefore, the CJEU also needs to look at the way the ECtHR has interpreted the concept of a criminal charge.
However, considering this provision, it is remarkable that the CJEU in general does not refer to the ECtHR or other relevant sources of human rights law and jurisprudence on a regular basis. References to these sources are only made sporadically and selectively, which may lead to "autonomous and potentially insufficiently informed case law" with regard to human rights matters. 8 To illustrate this, research shows that in the available case law of the CJEU from 2009 until the end of 2012 only in 27 of the 122 judgements in which the CJEU referred to the CFR the CJEU dealt to some extent with the substantive meaning of provisions of the CFR. In merely 10 out of the 27 cases, the CJEU actually referred to the case law of the ECtHR and in all these cases, the CJEU agreed with the reasoning of the ECtHR. 9 In the other 95 cases, reference was made to the CFR, but without focusing in depth on the substance, and in just 10 of these 95 cases, a provision of the ECHR was mentioned. 10 Although the CFR should offer at least the same protection as the ECHR, a gap in legal protection arose because the ECtHR did not have the competence to deal with complaints against the EU institutions concerning the violation of human rights, as the EU is not (yet) party to the ECHR in this sense (see the conclusion of this article for a more extensive discussion of this subject). 11 The question popped up as to what should be done with cases in which national authorities have acted in the course of implementing EU law without discretion, while thereby possibly infringing upon human rights. The ECtHR decided in Bosphorus that if a decision is taken by a national authority, the state remains responsible for that decision under Article 1 ECHR, even if it is dictated by international law. This would, in practice, mean that the ECtHR is assessing the lawfulness of EU law without having competence to do so. In order to solve this conflict, the Bosphorus doctrine was established, which formulates the presumption of equivalent protection: any activity of a Member State undertaken as a result of international obligations is presumed to be in accordance with the ECHR and to provide equivalent protection of fundamental human rights in its substance and its control mechanisms, unless the protection of these rights is manifestly deficient. 12 
Targeted Financial Sanctions
The term 'targeted financial sanctions' refers to the sanctions mentioned in Article 5 of Regulation 2988/95. This regulation aims to protect the Union's financial interests by introducing penalties that are "effective, proportionate and dissuasive" to ensure cor- "State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling the observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides". See also margin no 156: "If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation"; and margin no 156: "[A]ny such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient". It should be noted that the ECtHR does not use the term 'targeted financial sanctions'. However, this Court has ruled upon the nature of the administrative fine and a specific variant thereof -the tax surcharge -and these do fall within the scope of the Regulation (see sub a). The ECtHR has not ruled upon the nature of the other targeted financial sanctions that are discussed in this article, for these other sanctions are imposed only in the context of the EU regime.
II

The Qualification of Targeted Financial Sanctions by the ECtHR
This section first elaborates on the concept of a criminal charge as used by the ECtHR; next, the Court's qualification of the administrative fine and the tax surcharge is examined. In Engel and others v. the Netherlands 14 , the ECtHR decided to give an autonomous meaning to the concept of a 'criminal charge' and established three criteria to determine the existence of a criminal charge: the classification of the offence in domestic law, the nature of the offence, and the nature and degree of severity of the possible penalty. 15 The first criterion should be considered merely as a "starting point", whereas the nature of the offence is of greater importance. 16 With regard to the second Engel criterion, the ECtHR makes a distinction between the situation in which the relevant provision of the national legislation is directed at the general public and the situation in which it is directed at a specific group of people possessing a specific status. The former involves the determination of a criminal charge, whereas the latter belongs to the field of disciplinary law. 17 As to the explanation of the application of the third Engel criterion, see section III.2. It should be noted that the second and third criteria are not necessarily cumulative, but can be regarded as alternative. 18 If the ECtHR cannot arrive at a clear conclusion as to the existence of a criminal charge by an alternative approach, a cumulative approach can be used. 19 The Qualification of Administrative Fines by the ECtHR In Öztürk v. Germany, an administrative fine was imposed on the applicant, a Turkish citizen, for causing a traffic accident by colliding with another vehicle as a result of careless driving. 20 To be able to follow the hearing, Mr. Öztürk had to make use of an 
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EuCLR Vol. 6, 1/2016 interpreter, whose costs he had to bear himself. 21 According to Mr. Öztürk, this resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR that offers the free assistance of an interpreter if the person charged with a criminal offence cannot understand or speak the language used in the court. 22 The government argued that Article 6 ECHR was not applicable, since the applicant was not charged with a criminal offence, but with a regulatory offence. 23 However, the ECtHR held that Article 6 ECHR was indeed applicable, because -taking into account the autonomous notion of a criminal charge and applying the Engel criteria 24 -the fine was criminal in nature: although the penalty lacked a certain degree of severity, the rule was directed towards all citizens who take part in traffic, and its aim was to punish and deter. 25 The Court reiterated this line of reasoning in Lutz v. Germany 26 . A penalty is also presumed to be criminal in nature if not paying the fine leads to imprisonment or to notification on a criminal record. 27 The Qualification of Tax Surcharges by the ECtHR
The ECtHR has furthermore ruled upon the nature of a certain type of administrative fine, i.e. the tax surcharge. It has generally held that Article 6 ECHR does not apply to traditional taxation cases. 28 The ECtHR acknowledges the fact that fiscal payments are not part of the civil rights and obligations as mentioned in Article 6(1), for they belong exclusively to the domain of public law. 29 This has been confirmed in Ferrazzini v. Italy. 30 However, in Janosevic v. Sweden 31 the ECtHR decided otherwise. In this case, the applicant alleged that the decisions of the Tax Authority to enforce taxes and tax surcharges before a court had decided on the dispute violated his rights under Article 6 ECHR, more specifically the right to a fair hearing, the right to have proceedings within a reasonable time and the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law. 32 The government relied on the argumentation used in Ferrazzini v. Italy, as discussed above by arguing that tax disputes did not fall within the scope of Article 6 ECHR under its civil head, and suggested that it neither fell under its criminal head, because tax surcharges belonged to administrative law, their aim was preven-3 tive and fiscal in nature, and a prison sentence could not be imposed. 33 The ECtHR agreed on the conclusion that, in general, tax cases do not fall within the scope of Article 6 ECHR, but came to a different conclusion by applying the Engel criteria. Although tax surcharges are classified as administrative in domestic law, their aim is to punish and to enforce compliance with the rules on tax surcharges. Thus, they are deterrent and punitive measures. 34 Furthermore, the provisions are directed to the public in general and the punishment can be very severe in the sense that there is no fixed limit to the amount of the tax surcharge. 35 It can be concluded that in this case the ECtHR extended the application of Article 6 ECHR to tax proceedings by deciding that tax surcharges are criminal in nature. 36 This decision was further strengthened in Jussila v. Finland. 37 In this case, the applicant also alleged that he had not been appointed a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR in the proceedings in which a tax surcharge was imposed, because the courts did not hold an oral hearing. 38 The government argued that Article 6 ECHR was not applicable, since -according to the Finish legal system -tax surcharges form part of administrative law, in which criminal law provisions do not play a role. According to the government, tax surcharges could not be considered as court-imposed sanctions under a general rule, because they were targeted at a specific group of citizens, namely those who are obliged to pay the Value-Added Tax. Furthermore, the tax surcharges aimed to protect the fiscal interests of the state and to exert pressure on taxpayers to act in accordance with their legal obligations, and the tax surcharge, which was relatively low, could not be transformed into a prison sentence. 39 The ECtHR, applying the Engel criteria, concluded firstly that according to the classification of the offence in domestic law, tax surcharges are not criminal, but belong to the fiscal regime. 40 Secondly, the ECtHR noted, in contrast with the arguments put forward by the government, that tax surcharges were imposed by general legal provisions applicable to taxpayers in general, and that the purpose of the tax surcharges was to punish and to deter. 41 Although the penalty was not very severe, the ECtHR defined tax surcharges as criminal in nature and concluded that Article 6 ECHR was indeed applicable. However, the ECtHR also acknowledged that " [t] here are clearly "criminal charges" of different weight" and that
"[t]ax surcharges differ from the hard core of criminal law; consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with their full stringency". 42
It can be concluded that the ECtHR, using the Engel criteria, qualifies both administrative fines and tax surcharges as criminal in nature. This has been confirmed in later case law, such as Paykar Yev Haghtanak Ltd v. Armenia 43 -in which the Court decided that a tax surcharge was criminal in nature because of its amount -and Hannu Lehtinen v. Finland 44 , in which the ECtHR did not even mention the amount of the tax surcharge, but directly stated that a tax surcharge is criminal in nature, which was also the case in Kallio v. Finland. 45 / 46
The Qualification of Targeted Financial Sanctions by the CJEU
This section discusses the criteria the CJEU uses for considering sanctions to be of a criminal nature and examines the qualification of the different kinds of targeted financial sanctions.
Criteria for Qualifying Sanctions as 'Criminal in Nature'
Several criteria for qualifying a sanction as criminal in nature can be distinguished in the CJEU's case law. Firstly, the CJEU takes into account whether the rule is aimed at a specific group of people, such as those who have voluntarily applied for a scheme of aid. If the sanction is aimed at a specific group of people, it is considered to be administrative and not criminal in nature. It should be noted that the question whether the sanction applies to a specific group of people is intertwined with the argument relating to voluntariness, since the sanction can be aimed only at people who have voluntarily applied for Union aid. In Maizena 47 the CJEU stated that
"if traders themselves decide to take advantage of the special arrangements involving advance release of their security, they do so voluntarily and in the light of the economic advantage which they see therein. The penalty is thus no more than a counterbalance to the early release of the security, which is not released definitively but merely provisionally (…). 48
The CJEU applied the same line of reasoning in KCH 49 , where it considered that the rules in question were directed exclusively at persons who had voluntarily made use of an agricultural aid scheme. Annotator De Moor-Van Vugt points out that
"[i]t seems to be the idea of "contract" which defines the nature of the sanction: it cannot be a punishment, if one has agreed to it oneself." 50
Secondly, the CJEU considered whether the sanction forms an integral part of a scheme of aid or a scheme of security: if it is part of a scheme of aid or a scheme of security, the sanction is not considered to be criminal in nature. In Maizena, the CJEU set out reasons for considering a sanction as an integral part of a system of security:
"the penalty constitutes the corollary of the system of security and is intended to achieve the same objectives as the security itself. That sanction is imposed at a flat rate and is independent of any culpability on the part of the trader. It is therefore an integral part of the system of security at issue and is not criminal in nature." 51 To be an integral part of the system, the sanction should be "interwoven" with the underlying legal framework. 52 The argument of the sanction being an integral part of a scheme of aid or a scheme of security has been repeated in Germany v Commission 53 , where the CJEU emphasised that the sanction was inherently linked to a right following from the scheme of aid, and in KCH 54 and Bonda 55 .
Thirdly, the CJEU adopted the abovementioned Engel criteria by examining the nature of the infringements and the degree of severity of the sanctions in order to determine whether a sanction is criminal in nature in Spector Photo Group. 56 This was the first case in which the CJEU explicitly brought its case law concerning the notion of 'criminal nature' into conformity with the case law of the ECtHR. 57 The CJEU repeated this approach in Bonda, where the Court first examined the legal classification of the offence under EU law. Secondly, the Court addressed the purpose of the penalty to determine whether it was punitive. 58 In this regard, the CJEU took into account whether the measures could be applied to only a specific group of people, whether their aim was to protect the management of the EU funds and whether the penalty In Spector Photo Group, the CJEU discussed the nature of the administrative fine. In this case, a fine had been imposed upon Spector Photo Group and one of its managers for insider dealing. The CJEU applied the second and third Engel criteria and held that, considering the nature of the infringements and the degree of severity of the sanctions, it could be concluded that the sanctions were criminal in nature. 62 In Åkerberg Fransson, the CJEU discussed the nature of the tax surcharge, a specific type of administrative fine. 63 Åkerberg Fransson was accused of having committed serious tax offences and therefore a fine had been imposed upon him. In the course of subsequent criminal proceedings at national level, the question arose whether the ne bis in idem principle of Article 50 CFR was applicable. After a request by the national court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of EU law, the CJEU had to determine whether the previously imposed fine was criminal in nature. The CJEU did not itself decide the matter, but held that it was for the national court to determine the nature of the sanction, thereby taking into account the three Engel criteria, which the CJEU had reiterated in Bonda. 64 As explained in section V.2.a of this article, one might wonder whether in this specific case it would have been better if the CJEU itself had decided on the nature of the sanction. According to annotator Widdershoven, the 2 a) 59 However, as Widdershoven remarks, the latter factor should not be considered decisive. After all, in KCH the CJEU also qualified the sanction as not criminal in nature, although there was no way for it to become ineffective. Payment of an Amount Greater than the Amounts Wrongly Received (b)
In KCH, the CJEU ruled upon the nature of the sanction mentioned in Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 2988/95: the payment of an amount greater than the amounts wrongly received. This sanction had been imposed, because KCH had requested a higher export refund for the agricultural product it exported than the amount of refund it was entitled to receive. Referring to the same types of arguments as used in Maizena and Germany v. Commission, the CJEU found that the sanction imposed upon KCH was not of a criminal nature, since it formed an integral part of the aid systems and intended to ensure the sound financial management of EU funds. Moreover, the infringed rules were directed exclusively at people who voluntarily participated in an agricultural scheme of aid. According to the CJEU, it was undisputed that in the present case only traders who had applied for export refunds were likely to have the penalty of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 2988/95 imposed upon them. 66 On the basis of these arguments, the CJEU concluded that the sanction imposed upon KCH should not be qualified as criminal in nature, thereby following the opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl. 67 A remarkable aspect of the CJEU's judgment in this case is mentioned by annotator De Moor-van Vugt. She notes that the sanction imposed upon KCH -i.e. the sanction mentioned in Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 2988/95 -is comparable to the surcharge, which in turn is currently called a fine. As De Moor-van Vugt points out, it can be argued that it is peculiar that the CJEU in KCH did not qualify the sanction as criminal in nature, since administrative fines are normally considered to be criminal in nature, as explained above. 68 sanctions were not criminal in nature. The Court's argumentation can be divided into two parts: first, the CJEU used arguments from its own case law, and second, it discussed the criteria used by the ECtHR to determine whether a sanction is of a criminal nature.
Removal of an Advantage Granted by Community Rules (c) and Exclusion from an
The CJEU started with emphasising that the infringed rules were aimed at a specific group of people, that the penalties constituted specific administrative instruments which formed an integral part of the scheme of aid, and that they were intended to ensure the sound financial management of Union funds. 69 The Court then added three other reasons for considering the imposed sanctions not to be criminal in nature. Firstly, the CJEU referred to Article 1 of Regulation 2988/95, which states that any infringement that negatively affects the Union budget gives rise to the application of administrative measures and penalties. Secondly, the CJEU stated that it follows from Article 5(1)(c) and Article 5(1)(d) of that Regulation that these sanctions constitute administrative penalties. Thirdly, the CJEU mentioned that the ninth recital in the preamble to and Article 6(5) of that regulation stated that administrative penalties laid down in pursuance of the objectives of the common agricultural policy form an integral part of the schemes of aid, that they have their own purpose, and that the penalties may be imposed independently of any criminal ones, "if and insofar as they are not equivalent to such penalties." 70 It is clear that this third argument partly overlaps with what the CJEU held earlier in its judgment.
Additionally, the CJEU stated that applying the Engel criteria also led to the conclusion that the sanctions were not criminal in nature: the sanctions imposed in Bonda were not classified as criminal sanctions under EU law, their purpose was not punitive and their sole effect was to exclude Bonda from receiving aid. 71 Annotator Widdershoven notes that, as a consequence of Bonda, most administrative sanctions that can be imposed in the context of Union aid should be qualified asnon-criminal in nature. This was already clear from KCH as regards the sanction of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation 2988/95. It appears from Bonda that the sanctions of sub c and d are not of a criminal nature either. Widdershoven argues that application of the arguments used in Bonda leads to the conclusion that the same might apply to the sanctions of Article 5(1)(e) and Article 5(1)(f) of Regulation 2988/95. He furthermore points out that the nature of the administrative fine is not completely clear, but that these are hardly ever prescribed in regulations concerning Union aid, and that he would not be surprised if the CJEU qualified them as being non-criminal in nature. 72 In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that this case dealt with a different kind of administrative fine than Åkerberg Fransson. The first kind of fines imposed are done so in the framework of Union aid regulations. These fines are directed at a specific group of people -i.e. persons who have freely chosen to apply for Union aid -and "take advantage of the special arrangements involving advance release of their security" -and constituted an integral part of the system of security. 78 
Analysing and Evaluating the Similarities and Differences
The Criteria used by the ECtHR and the CJEU to Define a Sanction as Criminal in Nature Examining the case law of both Courts, it is clear that nowadays the Engel criteria are applied in order to determine whether a sanction is criminal in nature. The ECtHR has used these criteria since its Engel judgment in 1976, whereas the CJEU has referred explicitly to these criteria only since the Spector Photo Group case in 2009. The relatively late reference of the CJEU to the Engel criteria may be explained by the fact that the CFR was made formally binding by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, as a result of which the CJEU has to function in certain cases as a "human rights adjudicator" as well. 79 Since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the role of the CJEU as a human rights tribunal has augmented significantly due to the binding force of the rights included in the CFR, the increasing scope of the powers and competences of the EU, and the extended jurisdiction of the CJEU allowed by the Lisbon Treaty. 80 As a result of the binding force of the rights included in the CFR, Article 52(3) CFR became legally binding and the CJEU was obliged to offer at least the same protection as the ECtHR.
The Courts do not differ in their application of the first Engel criterion, i.e. the classification of the offence in domestic law. As to the second criterion (i.e. the nature of the offence) and the third criterion (i.e. the nature and degree of severity of the sanction) it can be concluded that there are not many considerable differences either. Both the ECtHR and the CJEU examine whether the aim of the sanction is to deter or dissuade and to punish. The CJEU additionally considers whether the aim of the sanction is to ensure the sound financial management of Union funds, which indicates that the sanction is not criminal in nature. Furthermore, both Courts take into account whether the sanction is addressed to a specific group of people or to the general public. However, the ECtHR applies a more narrow concept of 'a specific group', i.e. only certain professional groups such as lawyers or doctors, whereas the CJEU implements a broader concept in its case law by stating that a specific group of people can also consist of everyone who applies for a scheme of aid. Moreover, in the CJEU's reasoning the argument relating to voluntariness (see section IV.1) plays a role, whereas the same does not apply to the ECtHR. Lastly, the ECtHR has stated that it does not matter whether "the offenders deserve the stigma of the criminal penalty" 81 , whereas this may be taken into account by the CJEU.
The Qualification of Targeted Financial Sanctions by the ECtHR and the CJEU Administrative Fines and Tax Surcharges (Article 5 of Regulation 2988/95 sub a)
As is clear from section III.2, the ECtHR discussed the nature of the administrative fine in Öztürk v. Germany and Lutz v. Germany. Application of the Engel criteria led to the conclusion that the administrative fines imposed in these cases were qualified as criminal in nature. Moreover, the ECtHR has ruled upon the nature of a certain type of administrative fine, i.e. the tax surcharge (see section III.3). The ECtHR ruled in its earliest case law that tax surcharges are not criminal in nature; later, it held that these sanctions can be criminal in nature depending on the amount of the fine; and since Hannu Lehtinen v. Finland and Kallio v. Finland tax surcharges are qualified as criminal in nature, without any reference being made to the amount of the fine. This illustrates that, over time, the ECtHR has more and more easily qualified tax surcharges as criminal in nature, and in its most recent view their criminal nature is undisputed.
In contrast, the CJEU's view on the qualification of administrative fines and tax surcharges is not completely clear. It follows from section IV that two types of situations need to be distinguished: the situation in which the fine is aimed at a specific group of people and constitutes an integral part of a scheme of aid (as was the case in Bonda), and the situation in which the fine is aimed at the general public and does not constitute an integral part of a scheme of aid (as was the case in Spector Photo Group and Åkerberg Fransson). In the former case, the fine would probably be qualified as noncriminal in nature. In the latter case, the nature of the fine is not entirely clear. The administrative fine discussed in Spector Photo Group was qualified as criminal in nature. From this case, the more general statement has been deduced that when a fine is aimed at the general public, it is criminal in nature according to the CJEU. 82 However, in Åkerberg Fransson, the CJEU referred the question about the nature of the fine to the national court, which should apply the Engel criteria as referred to in Bonda. This is not in itself peculiar, since it is not uncommon for the CJEU to leave questions concerning the applicability of the ne bis in idem principle for the national court to decide. This follows from, for instance, the Van Esbroeck case, which dealt with the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). 83 The fact that the CJEU refers the question concerning the nature of the previously imposed fine to the national court is not very problematic either, for the national courts are obliged to apply the ECHR and take into account the ECtHR's case law on the ne bis in idem principle. Nevertheless, one might argue that it would have been better for reasons of clarity if the CJEU in the specific case of Åkerberg Fransson had itself decided upon the nature of the sanction. As annotator Widdershoven points out, the ECtHR -applying the Engel criteria, which the CJEU adopted in Bonda -decided in Janosevic v. Sweden that the fine imposed in that case was criminal in nature. As a result, one could agree with Widdershoven that in the specific case of Åkerberg Fransson -in which the criminal nature of the sanction was very clear -it might have been better if the CJEU itself had decided upon the nature of the sanction. The fact that it did not has two implications. First, it allows for some uncertainty as to the qualification of administrative fines by the CJEU, which could have been avoided if the Court itself had established the nature of the sanction. Future case law of the CJEU may clarify this matter.
Second, the fact that the CJEU in Åkerberg Fransson did not itself decide that the imposed fine was criminal in nature allows for the possibility that the CJEU did not want to follow the qualification by the ECtHR. 85 If the CJEU and the ECtHR indeed differ on the qualification of administrative fines, this will be problematic in light of Article 52(3) CFR, which obliges the CJEU to attach at least the same meaning and scope to rights provided by the CFR as the meaning and scope of corresponding rights in the ECHR. In this regard, the interpretation by the ECtHR of rights laid down in the ECHR is also of importance. 86 If the interpretation of the two Courts indeed diverges, the Member States would have two conflicting obligations: the principle of supremacy of Union law clashes with the obligation to act in accordance with the ECHR. 87 84 Widdershoven (fn. 64), margin no 7. 85 It should be noted that annotator Widdershoven mentions two other possible explanations for the fact that the CJEU referred the question whether the fine was criminal in nature to the national court. However, he notes that these explanations still do not explain why the CJEU in this concrete case did not itself decide upon the nature of the fine. 88 The EU shares its competence to regulate criminal justice with the Member States, resulting in a limitation of the scope of action of the Member States: Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence (Article 2(2) TFEU). The EU is able to strengthen judicial cooperation derived from the principle of mutual recognition and to harmonise procedural and substantive criminal law by establishing 'minimum rules'. It is thus clear that the EU is able to influence criminal proceedings in Member States.
However, the extent to which fundamental rights are protected in criminal proceedings in consequence of application of EU law cannot easily be defined. Taking into consideration the judgements in the Radu and Melloni cases, it can be concluded that protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitutions of Member States does not have priority over primacy of EU law and cannot provide a basis for refusing execution of a European arrest warrant.
The case of Mr. Radu concerned the execution in Romania of four European arrest warrants issued by the German authorities for acts of aggravated robbery. 89 Mr. Radu opposed to the execution of all European arrest warrants, stating that despite the fact that the ECHR and the CFR were not considered primary Union law at the time of the European arrest warrant procedure, this procedure must be interpreted and applied in conformity with these instruments. 90 The Romanian court asked preliminary questions essentially as to whether a Member State executing a European arrest warrant must observe the CFR and whether an executing Member State may refuse extradition when there is (a risk of) infringement of the requested person's rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention or Articles 6, 48 and 52 of the CFR. 91 Contrary to the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, who concluded that the judicial authorities must act in conformity with the fundamental rights set out in the Convention and the CFR 92 and that extradition might be refused in exceptional circumstances on the basis of these rights, which is the case when there is a risk of "fundamentally destroy[ing] the fairness of the trial" 93 , the CJEU decided that the executing judicial authorities cannot refuse to execute a European arrest warrant on the basis that the requested person was not heard by the issuing authority before the arrest warrant was issued. 94 Notwithstanding the general nature of the preliminary questions, the CJEU thus did not take the opportunity to declare as a general principle that the authority executing a European arrest warrant has to take into account the rights as contained in the CFR in order to unequivocally protect fundamental rights.
In Melloni the applicant, living in Spain, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for bankruptcy fraud by Italian courts in absentia, although represented by two lawyers of his choice, and extradited by the Spanish authorities to the Italian authorities on the basis of a European arrest warrant. 95 Mr. Melloni claimed that his right to a fair trial had been indirectly infringed, since there was no possibility in Italian law to appeal against sentences imposed in absentia, which violated the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional's case law that required a possibility to appeal as condition for surrender in case of serious offences. 96 However, this case law was not in line with Article 4a(1)(b) of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA as amended by the Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, which stated (among others) that if the convicted person had been "aware of the scheduled trial, had given a mandate to a legal counsellor, who was either appointed by the person concerned or by the State, to defend him or her at the trial, and was indeed defended by that counsellor at the trial", the executing judicial authority may not refuse to execute the European arrest warrant. 97 The CJEU highlighted that the abovementioned Framework Decisions were established to "facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation" in criminal cases in order to achieve an area of freedom, security and justice for which a high level of confidence -mutual recognition -between Member States is needed. 98 In addition, the CJEU found the line of reasoning of the national courts that their practice provides a higher standard of protection than Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 and thus has priority according to Article 53 of the CFR to be flawed. Such an interpretation would not only undermine the principle of primacy of EU law, but also allow a Member State to avoid applying EU legal rules that are in conformity with the CFR, which threatens the efficacy of that framework decision. 99 Thus, in this case, primacy and efficacy of EU law has precedence over the protection of fundamental rights.
The implication of these judgments in the future may result in a controversial situation: in consequence of the application of the principle of supremacy of EU law, the CFR grants maximum rights, whereas the ECHR contains minimum standards. By making the allowance of a higher standard of protection of fundamental rights dependent on the principles of primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law, the CJEU makes it de facto almost impossible for a Member State to grant a higher level of protection as permitted in Article 53 CFR. 100 Therefore, even though over the course of time human rights protection has received more attention from the economically oriented CJEU (see section I), certain limitations can still be identified.
Concluding Remarks
The ECtHR's case law on the qualification of targeted financial sanctions shows that if the aim of the sanction is to punish or deter, if the norm applies to the general public, and if the sanction or its consequences are very severe, the proceedings involve a criminal charge and Articles 6 and 7 ECHR will be applicable. The CJEU's approach can be summarised by stating that it is "greatly inspired by the aim of the sanctions and by the scope of the rules". 101 If the sanction intends to protect the Union's financial interests, and if it is aimed at a specific group of people (e.g. only people who have voluntarily applied for participation in a Union aid scheme), it will probably not be criminal in nature. It is interesting that the CJEU primarily mentions conditions that indicate that a targeted financial sanction is not criminal in nature, instead of conditions that indicate that they are criminal in nature -as such, the indications are negatively formulated. The analysis of the case law of both Courts leads to the conclusion that the possibility that the ECtHR and the CJEU differ on the qualification of administrative fines is not something which can be ruled out. Future case law concerning administrative fines may clarify this point. However, if there indeed is a difference in the qualifi-cation of administrative fines as criminal in nature, this will be problematic in light of Article 52(3) CFR.
It could be argued that the accession of the EU to the ECHR might lead to more clarity with regard to the ECtHR's viewpoint as to the qualification of the targeted financial sanctions mentioned in Article 5(1)(b-f) of Regulation 2988/95. At the moment, the ECtHR does not have the competence to decide upon disputes in which the EU is a party and the Bosphorus doctrine will be applied. 102 The accession of the EU to the ECHR might change this, because then the ECtHR will have the competence to decide on cases in which the EU is a party. If the case concerns a targeted financial sanction and one of the guarantees provided for in Article 6 or 7 ECHR is at issue, the ECtHR may need to formulate an opinion on the qualification of that targeted financial sanction: criminal in nature or not?
However, it is not likely that the accession of the EU to the ECHR will occur soon due to the obstructing behaviour of some Member States and the fact that the CJEU considered the agreement on the accession incompatible with Article 6(2) TEU or Protocol No 8 relating to Article 6(2) TEU. The Court expressed its serious concerns about the effect the accession would have on its exclusive authority to rule on matters of EU law, and considered the accession would be a hard matter to reconcile with the EU's specific features. Firstly, the Court held that the agreement on the accession would negatively "affect the specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law (…)" due to a lack of coordination in some respects between the ECHR (and its protocols) and EU law and the danger that the agreement might erode the principle of mutual trust between Member States. Secondly, the CJEU considered the agreement to be incompatible with Article 344 TFEU, since it allows disputes concerning the application of the ECHR in matters of EU law to be adjudicated by the ECtHR. Thirdly, according to the Court, the way in which the co-respondent mechanism and the procedure for the prior involvement of the CJEU are regulated does not preserve "the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law". Finally, the fact that the judicial examination of some of the EU's actions in the sphere of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) would lie in the hands of a "non-EU body", was considered problematic. 103 The negative conclusion of the Court regarding the accession of the EU to the ECHR might have surprised the Member States and the EU institutions -as there seemed to be a broad consensus at the CJEU hearing on 5 and 6 May, 2014, on the compatibility of the draft accession agreement with the EU Treaties -and can be considered as a "somewhat formalistic and sometimes uncooperative attitude in defence of its own powers vis-à-vis the European Court of Human Rights". 104 
